In this paper we study the effect of contract design on the performance of railway maintenance in Sweden, using a panel data set over the period [2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009][2010][2011][2012][2013]. The marginal effect of incentive intensity is estimated, showing that the power of incentive schemes improve performance as measured by the number of infrastructure failures. In addition, the performance incentive schemes result in a reallocation of effort from failures not causing train delays to failures causing train delays. 
to deal with moral hazard and adverse selection. Whether or not different contract designs have the desired effects needs to be tested empirically, both for policy reasons and to assess if theoretic arguments for certain designs are valid in the current case. This paper contributes to this line of research by studying the incentive structures in railway maintenance contracts in Sweden. More specifically, the purpose with this paper is to provide evidence on the effect of incentive intensity on infrastructure performance as well as the effect of tilted performance incentive schemes.
Sweden chose to gradually expose its maintenance of railways to competitive tendering in 2002. One objective of the transfer from in-house to tendered production of rail maintenance was to provide scope for innovation (Banverket 2000) . To do so, firms (contractors) are given degrees of freedom by the contracts: most of the maintenance contracts are said to be 1 outcome or performance based, meaning that the contractor is not told exactly which (or the level of) activities that are to be carried out. A fixed payment is received by the contractor who needs to meet a set of requirements with respect to the quality of maintenance.
The purpose is to give the contractor an incentive to develop the maintenance production. We are therefore in a second-best situation where the client (the IM) can (and has in this case chosen to) observe the outcome rather than prescribing the input. This can, however, create a moral hazard situation as the contractor's actions may not be optimal for the client. In addition, the contractor can obtain a higher rent when information about its efficiency (technology) is not known to the client, which is the problem of adverse selection. This asymmetry in information means that the client has to make a trade-off between inducing effort and extracting rent from the contractor. The power of the incentive scheme is a central parameter in this trade-off (see Laffont and Tirole 1986) . Moreover, the complexity of the project can affect the preferred power of the incentive scheme. Bajari and Tadelis (2001) 3 points out that a cost-plus contract (i.e. low powered contract) is preferred when the projects are complex, while fixed price contracts can be better for simple projects.
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One way of providing incentives is to use a performance incentive scheme in which the contractor receives an award and/or penalty for its performance. A contractor will make a trade-off between different tasks within a project if these are rewarded differently and the tasks are substitutes; see for example the seminal paper by Holmström and Milgrom (1991) .
Indeed, the performance incentive schemes in the maintenance contracts in Sweden are tilted (described in section 2.1), which can affect the attention to different tasks and consequently the outcome of the project.
The theoretic work on contracts and information asymmetry in the principal-agent framework is extensive (for textbook treatments, see for example Laffont and Tirole 1993 , Laffont and Martimort 2002 and Salanié 2005 . Wunsch (1994) is an early example of an empirical study on contract design within the field of procurement and regulation, where menus of linear contracts are calibrated for transit firms. Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) study the regulatory schemes for French urban transport and compare these to the optimal policies, while Roy and Yvrande-Billon (2007) use the same study object (in a different time period) to estimate differences in technical efficiency between regulatory schemes and fixed-price and cost-plus contracts. Other examples within the transport field are the study by Dalen and Gomez-Lobo (2003) -showing that high-powered incentive schemes reduce operating costs for bus companies in Norway -and the study by Piacenza (2006) with similar results for Italian public transport.
To the author's knowledge, an econometric test of the effect of incentive intensity has not been made in field of rail infrastructure management. Nonetheless, Vickerman (2004) provides an exploration of incentives in transport infrastructure maintenance, and a case study 2 A project that is complex such that quality is ex ante non-contractible might even be better to produce in-house instead of being contracted out (Hart et al. 1997 ).
on incentives in rail maintenance contracts is made by Stenbeck (2008) . Moreover, studies on the power of incentive schemes in procurement and regulation usually compare different types of contracts (for example fixed-price contracts compared to cost-plus contracts). We can however make use of the variation in the incentive intensity in the cost-reimbursement contracts that are used for railway maintenance services in Sweden. This enables an estimation of the marginal effect of incentive intensity within the same contract type.
There is a wide literature on the effects of performance payments; see for example Lazear and Oyer (2013) for a review of theories and empirical findings on incentives and performance (among other topics) in personnel economics. 3 A recent study on procurement and performance incentives is made by Lewis and Bajari (2014) , showing that penalties induced effort in high-way construction contracts (with welfare improvements and low contractor costs according to simulations). Our study adds to this literature by estimating the effects of performance incentives in rail infrastructure management, focusing on the reallocation of efforts.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the main ingredients of the railway maintenance contracts that are important for this study. The research questions and modelling approach are set out in section 3, where we also specify the models we estimate. A description of the data is provided in section 4. The results are presented in section 5 followed by a discussion of our findings in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
3 Other examples are Rosenthal et al. (2006) and van Herck et al. (2011) who provide reviews of empirical evidence in the health sector, Podgursky and Springer (2007) present evidence in the education sector and Devers et al. (2007) is a review of evidence on executive pay and firm performance.
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Maintenance contract design
Most of the railway maintenance contracts in Sweden are performance-based contracts.
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These contracts are a mix between a fixed price and a cost-plus contract, i.e. a fixed payment is received for certain activities while others have variable payments. In the competitive tendering of maintenance contracts, the firms place a bid that contain prices for activities with variable payments and a fixed payment they require for other activities. The procedure and timing is the following.
(1) The client provides a description of the maintenance area and specifies the expected amount of activities with variable payments that need to be performed each year and which of these activities that entail a fixed payment. (2) The firms submit bids comprising one fixed component as well as a unit price component, i.e. a unit price on each variable activity in the contract. (3) The bid with the lowest total cost wins.
Most contracts have a fixed payment for the (expected number of) activities required when an infrastructure failure occurs. However, the cost for each activity is capped; a clause states when the cost of rectifying a failure is included in the fixed payment to the contractor. It also indicates that when the cost is higher than the cap, the contractor is paid according to the variable cost for the amount above the specified cost level. For intuition, consider the following example illustrated in Figure 1 : the contractor receives a fixed payment for rectifying failures during one year. A clause states that if the cost of rectifying one failure is above 10 000 SEK, the contractor will be paid according to the direct cost of rectifying that failure (cost for labor and material resources according to prices stated in the contract) for the amount above 10 000 SEK. Hence, if the total cost of rectifying one failure is 15 000 SEK, the contractor will be paid 5 000 SEK in addition to the fixed payment. This reimbursement rule can vary between contracts, creating different levels of power in the incentives. The same 4 A few contracts are so called design-bid-maintain contracts in which the contractor mainly executes the activities set up by the client. These contracts are used for newly built railway lines.
reimbursement rule in each contract is used for maintenance activities that prevent infrastructure failures, i.e. for fixing a defect before it becomes a failure. 
Performance incentive schemes
Apart from capping the contractor's cost for some activities, the contracts also include a bonus and/or penalty linked to the number of failures in the maintenance area. These are tilted towards failures that cause train delays, which imply that an average train delay failure will have a larger impact on the bonus or penalty compared to an average failure not causing a train delay. For example, a contract using a performance index has the weight 1. In summary, the contracts are designed so that a contractor prefers a failure that is not causing train delays instead of a train delay failure. Note that this performance incentive scheme implies that a failure expected to cost more than the cost in the reimbursement rule (illustrated in Figure 1 ) has a probability of imposing an extra cost for the contractor if not rectified in time.
Research questions and modelling approach
In this paper, performance refers to the number of infrastructure failures that needs to be fixed immediately or within two weeks. There are other types of infrastructure quality indicators such as "minor" deviations in track geometry or other defects that require a preventive maintenance, i.e. activities that prevent infrastructure failures. Thus, a lack of preventive maintenance will result in a failure that requires corrective maintenance.
Given the design of the contracts, we formulate the following research questions:
1. Do variations in the reimbursement rule affect the performance of maintenance contracts?
2. Do performance incentive schemes tilted against train delays have an effect on the relationship between the number of failures causing train delays and other failures?
Model 1, presented in section 3.1, addresses the first research question. In section 3.2 we present Model 2 that addresses the second research question.
5 There are also contracts that do not have any bonus connected to train delays. However, all procured maintenance contracts have a penalty for the contractor if a time limit to rectify a train delay failure is exceeded.
For example, the penalty can be 10 000 SEK if it takes more than five hours to rectify a train delay failure.
Model 1
We express the cost of a maintenance project as The number of failures is represented by
where is a constant and is a vector of parameters for the effect of the explanatory variables . is an error term. is a parameter indicating the effect of preventive maintenance on the number of failures.
With the reservation of the caveat indicated by footnote 1, the level of preventive maintenance is not a direct decision made by the client in performance based maintenance contracts. Instead, the (winning) contractor receives a fixed payment, , corresponding to the bid submitted, and then decides on a level of effort which generates ( , ) and results in a disutility for the contractor Ѱ( ).
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Preventive maintenance's marginal effect on the cost of the project is decided by .
Hence, this is the contractor's efficiency parameter. It is also assumed that each contractor knows its own efficiency and that this parameter is continuous.
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As described in section 2, there is a reimbursement rule that states the maximum total cost per failure the contractor will bear. The corrective maintenance cost for a failure borne by the contractor is therefore
where = 1, . . , failure, is the reimbursement rule, is the accounted cost of rectifying a failure (see also Figure 1 ), where
This implies that the contractor bear a share ∈ [0,1] of the cost of rectifying a failure, which is determined by the relationship between ∑ =1 and ( ); that is = ∑ =1 ( )
. We can therefore express (4) as
which is an incentive contract where is the power of the incentive scheme. From equation (3) it is clear that an increase in the reimbursement rule would increase the corrective cost borne by the contractor ( ) for failures that cost more to rectify than the previous reimbursement rule, ceteris paribus. The power of the incentive scheme will therefore increase with the reimbursement rule:
When the maintenance project is tendered, a contractor considers its objective function that it wants to maximize
The setting outlined in equations (1)- (6) implies that an increase in the reimbursement rule increases the comparative advantage of the efficient contractor in the competitive tendering of a maintenance contract (causing a selection effect): in the quote for bids is one point of departure for the bid submitted. A higher will increase the share of cost that is borne by the contractor per failure, and will therefore reduce the contractor's utility ( = − ( ) < 0).
The consequence is that the higher reimbursement rule corresponds to submitting a higher bid. However, since contractors have different efficiency levels, , the expected marginal cost savings of efficiency increases with the reimbursement rule, Equations (1)- (6) also imply that the level of preventive maintenance increases with the reimbursement rule:
-When a contract has been awarded, the contractor will choose an effort level that generates preventive maintenance. This decision will depend on . A contractor that bears a larger share of the cost will clearly have a stronger incentive to reduce this cost, which it can do via ( , ). Indeed, by taking the cross partial derivative of the contractor's utility with respect to the reimbursement rule and the effort level (generating preventive maintenance)
we can see that the reimbursement rule increases the marginal cost savings of preventive maintenance.
Hence, a higher reimbursement rule generates effort (reduces the moral hazard problem).
Estimating the effect of the incentive schemes
We estimate the effect of the cost-reimbursement with the following model
11 referred to as Model 1, where = 1, . . , ( ) years. Our hypothesis is that a higher reimbursement rule will reduce the number of failures:
The effect of the cost reimbursement rule can be due to a selection effect and/or because it reduces the moral hazard problem. Hence, the estimation of Model 1 does not discriminate between these effects.
Model 2
The previous model focuses on the share of the cost per corrective maintenance activity that is borne by the contractor. However, there is also a performance incentive scheme in place (described in section 2.1). In particular, contractors may be penalised for the number of failures appearing each year and even more so for failures causing train delays. The profit for a contractor can then be formulated in the following way:
The term • ( + ) is the same as in equation (5), except that a distinction is now made between failures causing train delays
and other failures
In addition, and are the performance penalties incurred by the contractor for and respectively. The tilted incentive scheme implies that > , which will tilt the contractor's maintenance strategy towards preventing failures causing train delays. For example, consider a situation where two defects are found that have the same expected corrective maintenance cost, but one defect is more likely to cause train delays than the other (which can be due to the type or the severity of the defect). The contractor will then benefit more by first fixing the defect that is more likely to cause train delays, which increases the probability of the other defect to become a failure. However, the number of other failures must be handled in order to cap the risk of them causing train delays (for example, fixing failures require time slots on the tracks, and trains will eventually need to be rescheduled when the number of failures grows). We therefore consider other failures to have a secondorder effect ( ) on profit.
We characterize the contractor's maintenance strategy by the choice of efforts on preventing train delay failures and other failures, = ( , ), where one of the efforts crowds out the other. 7 In other words, the contractor's marginal cost of exerting increases with .
The contractor's choice of effort will be tilted towards as a result of its marginal effect on the contractor's expected cost of the project [ ]:
(note that < 0, and
Hence, a marginal increase in has a larger cost reducing effect (will be more profitable) than a corresponding increase in . This relationship only holds until a certain threshold is breached, which means that not all effort will be allocated to the prevention of train delay failures.
7 Dewatripont et al. (2000) characterizes this two-task situation by a strictly positive cross-partial derivative of the disutility of effort 2 Ѱ( , ) > 0.
For simplicity, we assume that ( , ) = ( , ) 13
Estimating the effect of tilted performance incentive schemes
There is no point in time where performance incentive schemes were introduced. For example, there are examples of performance clauses in contracts awarded to the in-house production units prior to the introduction of competitive tendering. It is reasonable to assume that in-house production in general had some sort of incentive structure to reduce train delays.
We can however use the sampling benefit from competitive tendering, which imply that it is more likely that the chosen contractor is efficient (see for example Armstrong and Sappington 2007, chapter 4) . This is also suggested by the results in Odolinski and Smith (2016) , showing that competitive tendering reduced maintenance cost in Sweden with about 11 per cent (which of course also can be explained by other factors than just the sampling benefit).
More specifically, we note that the effect of a maintenance strategy, where the choice of and is tilted to the former, is increasing with the efficiency parameter (the number of failures decreases with efficiency; see equations 9 and 10). Hence, the introduction of competitive tendering can be used to test the effect of performance incentive schemes, given that tendering has resulted in more efficient contractors being awarded the maintenance projects. Our hypothesis is therefore that the use of competitive tendering will increase the effect of the tilted performance incentive schemes. We test our hypothesis by estimating two models. Model 2a is related to train delays
is a dummy variable indicating when a maintenance area is tendered in competition and is used as a proxy variable for a change in the effect of tilted performance incentive schemes.
The other model is 
Selection bias
We need to consider a possible selection bias when estimating Model 2a and 2b. The maintenance of the Swedish railway network was gradually put out to tender, with the first contract tendered in 2002 and the last part of the network tendered in competition in 2014.
The estimates from the tendering dummy variables in Model 2a and 2b will be biased if there are systematic differences between areas tendered first and tendered later that are not controlled by the independent variables; omitted variable bias will be present. A selection bias
can also be present if we have reverse causality; if areas tendered first were tendered because they had high (low) probability of certain failures to occur. This issue -with respect to maintenance costs -is addressed in Odolinski and Smith (2016) who did not find such bias (see also Domberger et al. 1987 and Wheat 2012) . We use the same approach in this paper and construct a vector of dummy variables:
where = indicate when a segment is tendered in competition, = when tendered also includes year dummies ( = = 2004, … ,2013) . are parameters to be estimated. We note that a general difference-in-differences approach would include a dummy variable indicating all areas tendered and a dummy variable for the period after tendering, as well as an interaction between these variables; see for example Greene (2012, p.155-157) . We do not have a general post-tendering period as the exposure to competition was gradual.
Hence, we use year dummy variables to control for general effects that occur over time which leaves the tendering variable to pick up the impact of tendering. Moreover, we also include a dummy variable indicating all areas tendered in competition sometime during [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] along with the time-specific tendering variable, in line with the difference-in-differences approach.
Regression model
As previously mentioned, the performance measure used in this paper is the number of failures on the railway infrastructure, and is also the dependent variable in the models. This variable consists of non-negative discrete values, i.e. it is a count variable. The distribution of the number of failures in Figure 2 shows that a large share of the observations has no failures. Overdispersion can be present when a large fraction of the observations have a zero value, which is indicated by Figure 2 below. 11 Indeed, the sample variance is many times larger than the sample mean for the dependent variables used in Model 1, 2a and 2b (see sample means and standard deviations in Table 1 ). With access to panel data, i.e. a cross-section of contracts observed over time, we have a good opportunity to control for individual heterogeneity. The conditional mean is
where is the individual specific effect. If is independent of the regressors we would prefer a random effects model resulting in efficient and consistent estimates of . If the regressors are correlated with we could use a fixed effects model, resulting in consistent estimates of . 13 However, Allison and Waterman (2002) found that the conditional fixed effects negative binomial model, proposed by Hausman et al. (1984) , is not a true fixed effects model because the time-invariant variables do not drop out from the estimation.
Hence, the fixed effects are not conditioned out in this model. 14 An unconditional fixed effects negative binomial model can be used instead, which controls for the individual unobserved effects by including individual-specific dummy variables. A large panel (many individuals) can however result in biased parameter estimates due to the incidental parameters problem, first presented by Neyman and Scott (1948) . This leaves us with the random effects negative binomial model.
We will nevertheless have inconsistent estimates if the regressors are not independent of the individual effects . A solution, first proposed by Mundlak (1978) for the linear model (see also Chamberlain (1982 Chamberlain ( , 1984 ), is to include averages over time of the variables. This 12 The conditional variance in the NB1 model is
In the fixed effects negative binomial model, the dispersion is constant (1 + ) for each individual, while the random effects model assumes that 1 (1 + ) ⁄~( , ), which means that can vary randomly between individuals (see for example Hilbe 2011 for a specification of the negative binomial models with fixed and random effects). 14 Guimarães (2008) showed that the fixed effects are conditioned out only if the fixed effect equals the logarithm of the dispersion parameter, i.e. = ln ( ) model produces 'within' estimates using the random effects estimator and is often referred to as the correlated random effects model. For the non-linear case (see for example Papke and Wooldridge 2008, Cameron and Trivedi 2013) , the individual effect can be specified as
where ̅ ′ = −1 ∑ =1 for each = 1 … . Using (16) we can then express (15) as
where we are controlling for the correlation between and our regressors
Hence, we assume that the remaining individual effect in is independent of ′ .
Furthermore, (17) 
where is the count of failures, = track segment 1,2, … , and = year 1,2 … , ( ). (14) for definitions of the dummy variables. The tendering dummy is also interacted with a time trend taking the value 1 during the first year of tendering, 2 during the second year etc. The tendering dummies are included in Models 2a and 2b. Finally, is the individual effect as specified in (16) and is the dispersion parameter in the model, where we assume that 1 (1 + ) ⁄~( , ).
Data
The data set is an unbalanced panel over The letters preceding each variable name denotes whether the information is available at the segment-, section-, or contract area level. As noted in Table 1 , the information on traffic volume is available at the track section level. We make the assumption that each segment has the same traffic volume as the section it belongs to, which need not be the case in reality.
To provide an indication of the relationship between failures and the costreimbursement rule, we summarise the number of failures per million ton-km for each group of segments with the same cost-reimbursement rule. The correlation coefficient for these "cost-reimbursement groups" and failures per million ton-km is 0.50. Still, there are other factors than ton-km that can explain the number of failures. The rail weight is a proxy for the quality of the rail (and newer rails are generally heavier than the old). Moreover, the quality classification of the tracks determines the maximum speed allowed and the related track quality requirements with respect to track geometry. Other variables capturing the infrastructure's characteristics, such as curvature and sleeper age, have been analysed but excluded from the estimations due to high collinearity between variables (for example between rail weight and sleeper age).
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Results
Three models are estimated. Model 1 considers the effect of different reimbursement rules on the number of failures, and Models 2a and 2b the effect of incentive schemes with weights put on train delays.
̂( ) and ̂( + 1) is estimated, which means that we estimate the expected value of failures when the explanatory variable increases with one unit. The estimated
, referred to as a semi-elasticity. ̂ is an incidence ratio (IRR), expressed as
. Hence, an IRR<1 indicates a negative effect. The incidence ratios are reported in Tables 2 and 3 together with standard errors for the estimated coefficients ̂. All estimations are carried out with Stata 12 (StataCorp.2011). Table 2 shows the results from the estimations of the first model, which include results from both the random effects model and the preferred correlated random effects model. In the latter model, the coefficients for variables averaged over time are denoted 'between estimates' while the other coefficients are denoted 'within estimates' (referring to effects between and within segments, respectively).
Econometric results: Model 1
The 'within estimate' for rail weight is not significant in our preferred model, but has the expected sign (IRR=0.9987); the number of failures is expected to decrease when heavier rails are installed (note that there is a negative correlation between rail age and rail weight as old rails are lighter). However, the average rail weight per segment (RAIL_WEIGHTbar) picks up the 'between effects' and has a significant IRR at 0.9625. The difference in the parameter estimates for rail weight illustrates the difference between the random effects model and the correlated random effects model. The estimate in the random effects model uses both the within and between effects, which results in a significant IRR at 0.9789, which is between the estimates for rail weight in the correlated random effects model.
The IRR for quality class -which determines the maximum speed allowed and corresponding requirements on track standards -is not significant in the estimations. Track length (TRACK_L), which is the exposure variable, has the expected IRR of 1 and is significant. The estimations includes a squared term for million gross tonne density, and the estimates reflect a non-linear relationship with the number of failures, which is shown by both the within and between estimate in the correlated random effects model. have an unbalanced panel (Wooldridge 2013 ), but these were not jointly significant and dropped from the estimation.
Turning to the 'within estimate' for the contract design variable, REIMBR, we see that it has a negative effect on the number of failures (IRR=0.9610, p-value=0.000); we cannot reject ℎ 1. Hence, the estimation results suggest that an increase in the reimbursement rule gives an incentive to increase preventive maintenance (reduces moral hazard), which is a contract the efficient type is more likely to be awarded (selection effect).
The incidence rate ratio at 0.9610 indicates that an increase in the reimbursement rule with one unit (in our case with 1000 SEK) will reduce the number of failures with 3.9 percent (100*(1-0.961)). The average number of failures per contract and year is 340 in the sample (5.95 per segment). 16 Hence, the estimated effect of an increase in the reimbursement rule implies around 13 fewer failures per year for the average contract. We made sensitivity tests 16 The average track length in a contract area in the sample is about 340 km and the average segment length is 6 km 25 using either train delay failures or other types of failures as the dependent variable, which did not have an effect on the estimate for the cost-reimbursement rule. 
Econometric results: Model 2
The estimation results from Models 2a and 2b using correlated random effects are presented in The effect of competitive tendering over time was estimated using a trend variable.
The parameter estimate was not significant in either of the model estimations and this variable is excluded in our preferred models. 17 In fact, estimating the 99 per cent confidence interval for the difference between the estimates we can conclude that these are significantly different even at the 1 per cent level (see Cohen et al. 2003, p.46-47) . Holmström and Milgrom (1991) ; increased incentives for one task can result in a reallocation of attention from other tasks.
Are the performance incentive schemes beneficial with respect to the performance of the railway infrastructure? Unfortunately, we are not able to answer this question. For example, we do not have consistent information on total train delay minutes that each failure caused, which is an important overall measure of railway performance. A reduction in the number of train delay failures does not per se imply that the number of train delay minutes has decreased. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that a reduction in the number of train delay failures is a good sign of improved performance (note, however, that the estimate was not statistically significant). Still, the number of failures not causing a train delay has increased and possible consequences of this observation need to be further studied. For example, will this have an effect on the life cycle cost of the infrastructure? This is especially relevant considering the negative experience in Britain where misaligned incentive structures led to a deteriorating asset condition.
Conclusion
This paper offers evidence on the effect of different contract designs in rail maintenance services. It contributes to the existing literature by providing empirical evidence on the marginal effect of incentive intensity in the rail maintenance contracts, as well as the effect of tilted performance incentive schemes. More precisely, we have shown that a higher reimbursement rule increases the comparative advantage of the efficient contractor in the 31 bidding for contracts and that it induces effort, generating a higher level of preventive maintenance. The econometric results show that the reimbursement rule reduces the number of failures. However, we do not know if the effect is due to differences in efficiency among the contractors and/or differences in effort level. Still, the results show that the marginal effect of an increase in the incentive intensity in the contracts -corresponding to a 1000 SEK increase per failure in the cost-reimbursement rule -is a 3.9 per cent reduction of the number of failures.
The econometric test of the tilted performance incentive schemes confirms our hypothesis that it has an effect on the relationship between the number of failures causing train delays and other failures. We can conclude that this contract design seems to have been beneficial with respect to the number of train delay failures, yet at the expense of other types of failures.
Our findings are informative in considerations on the design of railway maintenance contracts, especially for other IMs across Europe that plan to use competitive tendering.
Setting a reimbursement rule too low can be costly for the IM with respect to the number of failures that occur, while a high reimbursement rule can induce rent extraction. Moreover, when using tilted performance incentive schemes, the IM needs to contemplate the reallocation of attention from other tasks. For example, its effect on future maintenance costs needs to be considered.
The results from this paper gives some support to the finding that the 11 per cent cost reduction in Sweden due to competitive tendering was not associated with a lower quality (see Odolinski and Smith 2016) , as measured by the number of train delay failures. An important caveat is, however, that we do not know its effect on train delay minutes, or the long-term effects of an increasing number of other types of failures. Whether the reallocation between different efforts is cost efficient or not needs to be further investigated. In general, the effect of different designs on cost efficiency in railway maintenance -considering both user and producer costs -is an area for future research. Such considerations are critical in the study of optimal contract design within this field.
Performance equation in maintenance contracts:
where =train delay hours, =number of failures, =quality number related to track geometry, where a higher number imply a better track geometry quality (which is why the target value is in the numerator in relation to the outcome value). Their respective coefficients are = 1.8, = 1.0 and = 0.2. If = 1 the contractor has reached the target values, and will receive a bonus when > 1. 
